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Abstract 
In five experiments, the authors examined the development of automatic response 
inhibition in the go/no-go paradigm and a modified version of the stop-signal paradigm. 
They hypothesized that automatic response inhibition may develop over practice when 
stimuli are consistently associated with stopping. All five experiments consisted of a 
training phase and a test phase in which the stimulus mapping was reversed for a subset 
of the stimuli. Consistent with the automatic-inhibition hypothesis, the authors found that 
responding in the test phase was slowed when the stimulus had been consistently 
associated with stopping in the training phase. In addition, they found that response 
inhibition benefited from consistent stimulus-stop associations. These findings suggest 
that response inhibition may rely on the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations after 
practice with consistent stimulus-stop mappings. Stimulus-stop mapping is typically 
consistent in the go/no-go paradigm, so automatic inhibition is likely to occur. However, 
stimulus-stop mapping is typically inconsistent in the stop-signal paradigm, so automatic 
inhibition is unlikely to occur. Thus, the results suggest that the two paradigms are not 
equivalent because they allow different kinds of response inhibition.  
 
Keywords: cognitive control, automaticity, response inhibition, stop-signal paradigm, 
go/no-go paradigm 
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Introduction 
Inhibition plays a central role in theorizing about human cognition. Inhibition refers to 
the suppression of thoughts, actions, and emotions and is often regarded as a key 
component of executive control (e.g., Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Baddeley, 1996; 
Logan, 1985; Miyake et al., 2000; Nigg, 2000; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz & Carter, 2004; Sylvester et al., 2003). Researchers have used the concept of 
inhibition to explain a broad range of phenomena in clinical psychology, cognitive 
psychology, neuropsychology, lifespan development, and individual differences. The role 
of inhibitory processes in several paradigms is still debated (see e.g., MacLeod, Dodd, 
Sheard, Wilson & Bibi, 2003), but most researchers agree that some kind of inhibition is 
involved in deliberately stopping a prepared motor response (e.g., Andres, 2003; Aron et 
al., 2004; Boucher, Palmeri, Logan & Schall, 2007; Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
MacLeod et al., 2003; Miyake et al., 2000; Nigg, 2000; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rubia 
et al., 2001; Stuphorn & Schall, 2006; Verbruggen, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2004). 
Response inhibition supports flexible behavior in a constantly changing environment: 
when actions are no longer relevant, they can be stopped and possibly replaced by other 
actions when needed.  
Two paradigms that are frequently used to study response inhibition are the 
go/no-go paradigm (Donders, 1868/1969) and the stop-signal paradigm (Lappin & 
Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Vince, 1948). In both paradigms, subjects are 
instructed to withhold a response when a no-go or stop signal is presented. In the 
literature, the two paradigms are often treated as equivalent (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; Nigg, 
2000) and researchers presume that the same inhibitory processes are responsible for 
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cancelling a response. However, in the present study, we show that this presumption is 
false and that response inhibition can be achieved through either automatic or controlled 
processing, depending on the consistency of associations between stimuli and stopping.  
The Go/No-Go Paradigm and the Stop-Signal Paradigm 
In the go/no-go paradigm, subjects are presented with a series of stimuli and are 
told to respond when a go stimulus is presented and to withhold their response when a 
no-go stimulus is presented (e.g., press the response key for the letter K but do not press 
the response key for the letter L). The mapping of stimuli onto go and no-go responses is 
explained at the beginning of the experiment and typically remains the same throughout 
the experiment. In this paradigm, the index of inhibitory control is the probability of 
executing a response on a no-go trial [p(respond|no-go)]. In the stop-signal paradigm, 
subjects usually perform a choice reaction task on no-stop-signal trials (e.g. press the left 
response key for the letter K and press the right response key for the letter L). On a 
random selection of the trials (stop-signal trials), a stop signal is presented after a 
variable delay (stop-signal delay or SSD), which instructs subjects to withhold the 
response to the go stimulus on those trials. The first index of inhibitory control is the 
probability of responding on stop-signal trials [p(respond|signal)], which is often 
evaluated as a function of SSD. The second index of inhibitory control is an estimate of 
the covert latency of the stop process, stop-signal reaction time (SSRT).  
The go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms are popular tools for investigating 
response inhibition in basic research in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. 
Both paradigms have been used to study response-inhibition deficits in clinical 
populations such as children and adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
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(Bekker et al., 2005; Iaboni, Douglas & Baker, 1995; McLean et al., 2004; Schachar & 
Logan, 1990), patients with schizophrenia (Badcock, Michie, Johnson & Combrinck, 
2002; Kiehl, Smith, Hare & Liddle, 2000), Parkinson’s disease (Gauggel, Rieger & 
Feghoff, 2004; Hershey et al., 2004), and autism (Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997; Schmitz et 
al., 2006). In addition, researchers have used the paradigms to study effects of aging and 
development (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan & Strayer, 1994; Levin et al., 1991; 
Nielson, Langenecker & Garavan, 2002; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan & 
Tannock, 1999) and to test individual differences in constructs such as impulsivity 
(Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards & de Wit, 2006).  
In the response-inhibition literature, it is common to generalize the results 
obtained in the go/no-go paradigm to the stop-signal paradigm, and vice versa. The 
rationale is that response inhibition is achieved in the same way in the two paradigms. 
Performance in both paradigms is typically described in terms of a race between two 
competing processes: a go process and a stop process (Logan, 1981; Logan & Cowan, 
1984). In the go/no-go paradigm, the go process is triggered by stimulus presentation 
because of a prepotent response tendency, and the stop process is triggered by the 
identification of the no-go stimulus. In the stop-signal paradigm, the go process is 
triggered by the presentation of the go stimulus and the stop process is triggered by the 
presentation of the stop signal. The probability of responding on a no-go trial or a stop-
signal trial depends on the relative finishing time of the go process and the stop process. 
When the stop process finishes before the go process, response inhibition is successful 
and no response is emitted; when the go processes finishes before the stop process, 
response inhibition is unsuccessful and the response is incorrectly emitted. 
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In their executive act of control model, Logan and Cowan (1984) suggested that 
an executive system inhibits a response by replacing the go goal, which is associated with 
responding to the go stimulus, with a stop goal, which associated with withholding a 
response. When the go goal is no longer active, processing in the subordinate systems 
that execute the response stops relatively quickly, often within 200–300 ms of stop-signal 
presentation. In the present study, we investigated whether activating the stop goal in the 
go/no-go paradigm is indeed an executively controlled process. More specifically, we 
investigated whether the stop goal can be automatically activated through memory 
retrieval of consistent associations between the no-go stimulus and stopping.  
Automatic Response Inhibition 
Theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes develop over practice. 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) distinguished between consistent and varied mappings of 
stimuli onto responses. In consistent mapping, the stimulus is (consistently) mapped onto 
the same response throughout practice, whereas in varied mapping, the stimulus is 
(inconsistently) mapped onto different responses throughout practice. In consistent 
mapping, associations between the stimulus and response are formed and automatic 
processing develops across practice. In varied mapping, inconsistent stimulus-response 
associations are formed, thereby preventing automatic processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977). In a similar vein, Logan (1988) proposed that attending to a stimulus leads to the 
storage of a new processing episode, which consists of a specific combination of the 
stimulus, the interpretation given to the stimulus, the response, and the task goal. When 
the stimulus is repeated, previous processing episodes are retrieved, facilitating 
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performance if the mapping is consistent and impairing performance if the mapping is 
inconsistent.  
The distinction between consistent and varied mapping suggests that automatic 
response inhibition could develop in the go/no-go paradigm but is unlikely to develop in 
the stop-signal paradigm, suggesting an important difference between the paradigms. In 
the go/no-go paradigm, the go stimuli are consistently associated with going and the no-
go stimuli are consistently associated with stopping. This consistent mapping of stimuli 
onto goals may allow automatic inhibition to develop over the course of the experiment: 
go stimuli may automatically activate the go goal while no-go stimuli may automatically 
activate the stop goal (Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). When the stop goal is 
activated through memory retrieval, go processing may be suppressed without the need 
for additional control processes. By contrast, in the stop-signal paradigm, each choice 
stimulus is usually associated with going (on no-stop-signal trials) and stopping (on stop-
signal trials), so automatic inhibition could not support successful stop-signal 
performance (Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) and executive control processes 
would be needed to stop the response (Logan & Cowan, 1984).  
The consistent mapping in the go/no-go paradigm and the inconsistent mapping in 
the stop-signal paradigm suggests that automatic, bottom-up inhibition and controlled, 
top-down inhibition may be differentially involved in the two paradigms. This suggests 
that the two paradigms may not be equivalent because they put different demands on 
cognitive control. Given the widespread assumption that the two paradigms are 
equivalent, this issue has important implications for many literatures, including research 
on response inhibition in cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology, 
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aging, and individual differences. The purpose of the present study is to explore the 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis—the hypothesis that consistent stimulus-stop mappings 
can lead to automatic retrieval of the stop goal—in the go/no-go paradigm (Experiments 
1-4) and in a modified version of the stop-signal paradigm (Experiment 5).  
The Present Study 
 The automatic-inhibition hypothesis assumes that automatic inhibition will 
develop across practice with consistent mappings of stimuli onto the stop goal (Logan, 
1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The stop goal is an 
abstract cognitive representation of not responding to a stimulus, and we assume that this 
representation will be associated with no-go stimuli. When a no-go stimulus is repeated, 
the stop goal will be activated through memory retrieval, which may facilitate response 
inhibition and ultimately, may be sufficient to stop the response without intervening 
control processes. We tested this hypothesis in five experiments in which we focused on 
the role of stimulus-stop associations. This focus does not imply that we assume that no 
other learning effects can occur, and as our data will show, stimulus-category 
(Experiment 2) and category-goal associations (Experiment 3) most likely also play a 
role.  
 In Experiments 1-4, subjects made semantic judgments (e.g., living or non-living) 
about the referents of words in a go/no-go paradigm. Whether the stimulus required a 
response was determined by the stimulus category (e.g., ‘living = go’ and ‘non-living = 
no-go’). Each experiment consisted of a training phase, in which we repeated each 
stimulus several times, and a test phase, in which we reversed the go and the no-go 
categories (e.g., ‘living = go’ and ‘non-living = no-go’ in the training phase became ‘non-
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living = go’ and ‘living = no-go’ in the test phase). By reversing the go/no-go categories, 
stimuli that were associated with stopping in the training phase required a go response in 
the test phase and vice versa. The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts slower 
responses to go stimuli in the test phase that were associated with stopping in the training 
phase. Consistent mapping of these stimuli onto stopping during training should cause the 
stop goal to be retrieved automatically when the go/no-go categories are reversed in the 
test phase, and the retrieved stop goal should suppress responding. In Experiments 1-4, 
we cannot distinguish between stimulus-go-response associations (i.e., associations 
between the stimulus and cognitive representation of the to-be-executed response, namely 
pressing the space bar) and stimulus-go-goal associations (i.e., associations between the 
stimulus and a more abstract cognitive representation of the action, namely the goal of 
responding to a word on the screen, without specifying the exact response). In 
Experiment 5, we can distinguish between go-response and go-goal associations, and we 
will show that at least part of the effects is due to the retrieval of stimulus-go-goal 
associations. For consistency and simplicity, we refer to both types of association as 
stimulus-go associations (similarly, we will refer to stimulus-stop-goal associations as 
stimulus-stop associations). 
In Experiment 5, we tested whether automatic inhibition is a specific 
characteristic of the go/no-go paradigm or a more general phenomenon that depends on 
the consistency of the stimulus-stop associations. To this end, we asked if automatic 
response inhibition could also occur in a modified version of the stop-signal paradigm in 
which some of the stimuli were associated consistently with going and stopping. The 
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automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts that under these circumstances, automatic 
response inhibition would also occur in the stop-signal paradigm. 
Experiment 1 
There were two conditions: the inconsistent-test-phase condition, which assessed the 
effect of automatic inhibition, and consistent-test-phase condition, which served as a 
within-subjects control condition. The inconsistent-test-phase condition consisted of two 
phases: a training phase, in which we presented go and no-go stimuli for several 
repetitions, and a test phase, in which we reversed the go/no-go mapping (e.g., ‘living = 
go’ and ‘non-living = no-go’ in the training phase whereas ‘non-living = go’ and ‘living = 
no-go’ in the test phase) and added a set of new stimuli to assess learning. The automatic-
inhibition hypothesis predicts that go stimuli will be associated with going and no-go 
stimuli will be associated with stopping in the training phase. Consequently, when go/no-
go mapping is reversed in the test phase, go RTs will be longer for old stimuli that were 
associated with stopping than for new stimuli that were not presented in the training 
phase. An alternative, no-stop-learning hypothesis, assumes that subjects learn 
associations between go stimuli and going but not between no-go stimuli and stopping. 
Consequently, this hypothesis predicts no difference in go RT between old and new 
stimuli in the test phase.  
In addition to go RTs, we looked at p(respond|no-go). Both the automatic-
inhibition hypothesis and the no-stop-learning hypothesis predict that p(respond|no-go) 
will be higher for old stimuli than for new stimuli in the test phase. Old stimuli were 
previously associated with going, so go RTs should be shorter for old stimuli than for 
new stimuli. Because response inhibition on no-go trials depends on the relative finishing 
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time of the go process and stop process (see above; Logan, 1981; Logan & Cowan, 
1984), p(respond|no-go) will increase when the finishing time of the go process 
decreases, resulting in higher p(respond|no-go) for old stimuli than for new stimuli.  
In addition to the inconsistent-test-phase condition, we included a within-subjects 
control condition—the consistent-test-phase condition—which also consisted of a 
training phase and a test phase, in which new items were introduced along with the old 
ones. The go/no-go mapping was the same in the training phase and the test phase. The 
consistent-test-phase condition allowed us to test stimulus-specific learning effects under 
consistent mapping. The automatic-inhibition hypothesis and the no-stop-learning 
hypothesis both predict that go RTs will be shorter for old stimuli than for new stimuli in 
the test phase: old stimuli will be associated with going in the training phase whereas new 
stimuli will not. Thus, go RTs should be shorter for old stimuli than for new stimuli in the 
test phase. The two hypotheses make different predictions for p(respond|no-go). The 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis assumes that old stimuli are associated with stopping but 
new stimuli are not. Consequently, the stop process will finish sooner for old stimuli than 
for new stimuli, resulting in lower p(respond|no-go). By contrast, the no-stop-learning 
hypothesis assumes that no stimulus-stop associations are learned, so p(respond|no-go) 
should be the same for old and new stimuli.  
It is possible that in addition to stimulus-go associations, subjects may learn other 
stimulus-specific associations, such as stimulus-category associations. In that case, the 
no-stop-learning hypothesis also predicts that p(respond|no-go) would be lower for old 
items than for new items in the consistent-test-phase condition because old items would 
categorized faster than new items. More generally, this would imply that some of the 
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effects (e.g., speeding of the go RT for consistent go items) could be caused partly by the 
retrieval of stimulus-category associations. We will discuss this in more detail when it is 
relevant for the interpretation of our data.  
Note that the inconsistent- and consistent-test phase had the same procedure 
except for the reversal of mapping of categories onto go and no-go responses in the test 
phase. The two conditions were compared within subjects, so we used different judgment 
tasks and different stimulus sets for the two conditions (living/non-living judgments for 
one; large small/judgments for the other) to avoid transfer effects between conditions. 
The judgment tasks assigned to each condition were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Method 
 Subjects. Sixteen subjects from Vanderbilt University participated for monetary 
compensation ($12). All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
native speakers of English. 
 Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was run on a PC running Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen & Vandierendonck, 2006) and the stimuli were presented on a 
21-in monitor. A list of 128 words was drawn from a list of 640 words used by Arrington 
and Logan (2004). Word length and word frequency data appear in Table 1. For every 
subject, 4 different subsets of 32 words were selected. For each set, there were 8 large 
living stimuli, 8 small living stimuli, 8 large non-living stimuli and 8 small non-living 
stimuli. The first subset was presented in the training and test phase of the inconsistent-
test-phase condition and the second subset was presented in the test phase of the 
inconsistent-test-phase condition only. The third subset was presented in the training and 
test phase of the consistent-test-phase condition and the fourth subset was presented in 
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the test phase of the consistent-test-phase condition only. All stimuli were presented in a 
white lower case Courier font on a black background and ranged from 12 to 52 mm in 
width (approximately 1.1° to 5.0°) and 4 to 7 mm (approximately 0.4° to 0.7°) in height.  
Procedure. Subjects participated in both the inconsistent- and consistent-test-
phase conditions. The order of the conditions, the order of the judgment tasks, and the 
go/no-go mapping were completely counterbalanced. Subjects were seated individually in 
private testing rooms after providing informed consent. The experimenter left the room 
after giving instructions and watching the first few practice trials. Subjects received 
instructions for the second condition after they had finished the first condition. In the 
inconsistent-test-phase, subjects received new instructions after the training phase, 
explaining the new go/no-go mapping rules. Instructions for the second condition and 
instructions for the test phase of the inconsistent-test-phase condition were presented on 
the screen. Subjects could decide when to continue by pressing the space bar. 
The training phase of the inconsistent-test-phase condition consisted of 8 blocks 
of 64 trials. In each training block, the words from the first subset of 32 words were 
presented two times. The training phase was followed by a test phase in which the go/no-
go mapping was reversed (e.g., ‘living = go’ and ‘non-living = no-go’ in the training 
phase and ‘non-living = go’ and ‘living = no-go’ in the test phase). The test phase 
consisted of 3 blocks of 64 trials. In each test block, the words from the first subset of 32 
words (i.e., the old items) and the second subset of 32 words (i.e., the new items) were 
presented once in random order.  
The training phase of the consistent-test-phase condition consisted of 8 blocks of 
64 trials. In each training block, the words from the third subset of 32 words were 
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presented two times. The test phase consisted of 3 blocks of 64 trials. In each test block, 
the words from the third subset of 32 words (i.e., old stimuli) and the fourth subset of 32 
words (i.e., new stimuli) were presented once in random order. The go/no-go mapping 
was the same (i.e., consistent) for the training phase and the test phase. There were no 
other differences between the two conditions.  
 In the inconsistent-test-phase condition, the go/no-go mapping was defined by the 
stimulus category. Half of the subjects made living/non-living judgments about the 
referents of words. The other half of the subjects decided whether the referent was 
smaller or larger than a basketball. This resulted in four possible go/no-go mappings, 
which are summarized in Table 2. In the consistent-test-phase condition, the go/no-go 
mapping was also defined by the stimulus category (see Table 2). If subjects made 
living/non-living judgments in the inconsistent-test-phase condition, then they made 
small/large judgments in the consistent-test-phase condition. If subjects made small/large 
judgments in the inconsistent-test-phase condition, then they made living/non-living 
judgments in the consistent-test-phase condition.  
In both phases of both conditions, all trials started with the presentation of the 
word in the center of the screen. Subjects were instructed to press the space bar of a 
QWERTY keyboard with the index finger of the dominant hand as quickly as possible 
when a go stimulus was presented and refrain from pressing it when a no-go stimulus was 
presented. The word remained on the screen for 1,000 ms, regardless of go RT in order to 
equate study time for go and no-go stimuli. A response could be given only while the 
stimulus was on the screen. Regardless of whether a response was given, the trial ended 
at stimulus offset. The intertrial-interval was 750 ms. At the end of each block, the mean 
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RT on go trials, the number of missed responses on go trials, and the number of incorrect 
responses on no-go trials were displayed and subjects had to pause for 10 seconds, after 
which they could continue by pressing the space bar. 
Results and Discussion 
 Mean go RT and p(respond|no-go) are depicted in Figure 1. The percentage of 
correct go trials (i.e., go trials on which a response was executed) was 96% and was not 
further analyzed. Mean RTs for correct go trials were calculated after removal of RTs 
longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean for each trial type (2.5%). In this experiment (and all 
following experiments), p(respond|no-go) was calculated without removal of outlying 
RTs. 
Global analyses of the training-phase and test-phase data and an overview of the 
relevant planned comparisons appear in Appendix 1. The training phase data show that 
go RTs and p(respond|no-go) decreased over practice for both conditions, suggesting that 
learning occurred (see Figure 1 and Appendix 1). The main question is whether there was 
evidence of stimulus-specific learning in the test phases of the inconsistent-test-phase and 
consistent-test-phase conditions. 
 Inconsistent-test-phase condition. The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts 
that go RTs should be longer for old stimuli than for new stimuli, whereas the no-stop-
learning hypothesis predicts that go RTs should be similar for old and new stimuli. 
Overall, go RTs were longer for old stimuli (559 ms) than for new stimuli (547 ms), 
although this main effect just failed to reach significance (see Appendix 1). The 
difference between stimulus types was influenced by practice in the test phase. As can be 
seen in the top left panel of Figure 1, go RTs were shorter for old stimuli (566 ms) than 
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for new stimuli in block 9 (590 ms), suggesting a benefit that carried over from the 
training phase. However, go RTs for new items sped up substantially over practice in the 
test phase whereas go RTs for old items remained relatively stable. As a result, go RTs 
were significantly longer for old stimuli than for new stimuli in blocks 10-11 (block 10: 
old = 565 ms, new = 535 ms; block 11: old = 546 ms, new = 517 ms). This result 
confirms with automatic-inhibition hypothesis, which predicts that learned associations 
between old stimuli and stopping impairs go performance in the test phase, and 
disconfirms the no-stop-learning hypothesis, which predicts similar go RTs for old and 
new stimuli in all blocks of the test phase.  
For p(respond|no-go), the difference between the stimulus types was also 
influenced by practice in the test phase. As can be seen in the bottom left panel of Figure 
1, p(respond|no-go) for old stimuli remained relatively stable over the test blocks whereas 
p(respond|no-go) for new stimuli decreased substantially over blocks 9-11. As a result, 
p(respond|no-go) was significantly lower for old stimuli (8.9 %) than for new stimuli (14 
%) in the beginning of the test phase (i.e., block 9) whereas the opposite was observed at 
the end of the test phase (i.e., block 11; old = 9.8%, new = 4.3%). Mirroring the go RT 
data, this finding suggests that subjects learned associations between the new stimuli and  
stopping relatively quickly in the test phase whereas learning these new stimulus-stop 
associations was much slower for old items.  
Consistent-test-phase condition. To test the learning effects under consistent 
mapping, we compared performance with old and new items in the test phase of the 
consistent-test-phase condition. As can be in seen in Figure 1, we found that go RTs 
decreased over blocks and were consistently shorter for old stimuli (506 ms) than for new 
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stimuli (547 ms). This result confirms the idea that associations between old stimuli and 
going were learned during the training phase and facilitated performance in the test 
phase. However, the difference between old and new stimuli became smaller over blocks 
9-11: whereas go RTs for old stimuli remained relatively stable, go RTs for new stimuli 
sped up substantially (see Figure 1), suggesting that subjects quickly learn to associate 
the new stimuli with going. We found similar effects for p(respond|no-go). Overall, 
p(respond|no-go) was lower for old stimuli (3.4%) than for new stimuli (9.2%). This 
finding suggests that response inhibition benefited from a consistent stimulus-stop 
mapping and confirms the predictions of the automatic-inhibition hypothesis. In line with 
the go RT data, we found that the difference between old and new items became smaller 
over blocks 9-11. 
 Discussion. In Experiment 1, we tested the automatic-inhibition hypothesis and 
no-stop-learning hypothesis by comparing performance for old and new items in the test 
phase of the inconsistent- and the consistent-test-phase conditions. In the inconsistent-
test-phase condition, we found that go RTs were longer for stimuli that were associated 
with stopping (i.e., the old stimuli) than for stimuli that were not associated with going or 
stopping (i.e., the new stimuli) in blocks 10-11. This finding confirms the automatic-
inhibition hypothesis, which predicts that responding is automatically suppressed when 
the stop goal is activated through the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations, and 
disconfirms the no-stop-learning hypothesis, which predicts no difference between old 
and new stimuli. We also found that subjects were less likely to respond to old no-go 
stimuli than to new no-go stimuli in the consistent-test-phase condition in blocks 10-11, 
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suggesting that response inhibition benefited from consistent associations between the 
stimulus and stopping.  
 In the training phase of both conditions, we found that performance improved 
substantially over practice. As can be seen in Figure 1, the greatest gain was observed in 
the beginning of the training phase, which is a characteristic of learning curves in skill 
acquisition (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). Similar learning effects were observed for the 
new stimuli in the test phase: in both conditions, go RT and p(respond|no-go) decreased 
substantially over blocks 9-11. Combined, these findings suggest that subjects quickly 
learned the associations between new no-go stimuli and stopping, and between new go 
stimuli and going. The results of the inconsistent-test-phase condition suggest that 
additional learning effects could also have played a role. In block 9, both go and stop 
performance was slightly better for old stimuli than for new stimuli. This suggests an 
initial learning benefit for old items. This benefit could be due to the retrieval of 
stimulus-category associations (see e.g., Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Logan, 1990; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977), which works against the cost from retrieving the stimulus-stop 
associations. For new stimuli, there are initially no stimulus-category associations, so go 
RT is longer for new stimuli than for old stimuli at the beginning of the test phase. 
However, subjects quickly learn the stimulus-category associations for new stimuli, 
which speeds up go RT substantially. This stimulus-category repetition benefit is not 
counteracted by a stimulus-stop association, so go RT actually becomes shorter for new 
stimuli than for old stimuli over practice in the test phase.  
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we examined learning effects under inconsistent and consistent 
stimulus-stop and stimulus-go mapping. The results of the inconsistent-test-phase 
condition confirmed the predictions of the automatic-inhibition hypothesis, which 
assumes that subjects learn associations between no-go stimuli and stopping. In 
Experiment 2, we further investigated the role of specific stimulus-stop associations in 
the go/no-go paradigm. In contrast to Experiment 1, in which the judgment task was 
always the same for the training and test phases of the same condition (see Table 2), we 
used different judgment tasks for the training and test phase: large/small judgments and 
living/non-living judgments (e.g., ‘living = go’ and ‘non-living = no-go’ in the training 
phase, but ‘small = go’ and ‘large = no-go’ in the test phase). This manipulation produced 
consistent stimuli and inconsistent stimuli. For the consistent stimuli, the stimulus-stop 
and stimulus-go mappings were the same in the training phase and in the test phase (e.g., 
small living stimuli), even though the go category had changed (i.e., ‘living = go’ in the 
training phase changed to ‘small = go’ in the test phase). For the inconsistent stimuli, the 
stimulus-stop and stimulus-go mappings were different for the training phase and the test 
phase (e.g., large living stimuli). The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts (and the 
results of Experiment 1 suggest) that the stimuli are directly associated with going and 
stopping. In the test phase, these stimulus-stop and stimulus-go associations would be 
retrieved, even though the judgment tasks and relevant stimulus categories were different 
from the training phase. Consequently, the automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts 
longer go RTs for inconsistent stimuli that are associated with stopping in the training 
phase than for consistent stimuli that are associated with going in the training phase. 
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Similarly, the automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts higher p(respond|no-go) for 
inconsistent no-go stimuli that are associated with going in the training phase than for 
consistent no-go stimuli that are associated with stopping in the training phase.  
Method 
 Subjects. Twenty-four subjects from Vanderbilt University participated for 
monetary compensation ($12). All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and were native speakers of English. None of them participated in Experiment 1.  
 Apparatus and stimuli. These were similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following: a list of 60 words was drawn from a list of 640 words used by Arrington and 
Logan (2004). Word length and word frequency data appear in Table 1.  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except for the following: 
All subjects started with a training phase, which consisted of 20 blocks, followed by a 
test phase, which consisted of two blocks. Each block consisted of 60 trials and each 
stimulus was presented one time per block. Half of the subjects decided whether the 
referents of the words were living or non-living in the training phase and decided whether 
the referents were smaller or larger than a computer screen in the test phase (we told the 
subjects to use the computer screen on which the stimuli were presented as a reference 
point). For the other half, the order was reversed. Subjects received instructions for the 
test phase after they finished the training phase. The go/no-go mappings and the order of 
the conditions were counterbalanced.  
 In the test phase, 1/4 of the stimuli were consistent go stimuli (i.e., go stimulus in 
the training and test phases), 1/4 were consistent no-go stimuli (i.e., no-go stimulus in the 
training and test phases), 1/4 were inconsistent go stimuli (no-go stimulus in the training 
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phase and go stimulus in the test phase), and 1/4 were inconsistent no-go stimuli (i.e., go 
stimulus in the training phase and no-go stimulus in the test phase). 
Results and Discussion 
Mean go RT and p(respond|no-go) data are depicted in Figure 2. The percentage 
of correct go trials was 98% and was not further analyzed. Mean RTs for correct go trials 
were calculated after removal of RTs longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean for each trial 
type (2.3%). Global analyses for the data of the test and training phases appear in 
Appendix 2. As in Experiment 1, there was substantial learning during the training phase. 
Mean RT decreased as a negatively-accelerated function of practice, which is 
characteristic of changes in RT with practice. A similar learning effect was observed for 
p(respond|no-go). Again, we will focus on the test phase only.  
As can be seen in Figure 2, go RTs were longer for inconsistent stimuli (576 ms) 
than for consistent stimuli (547 ms), suggesting that subjects learned stimulus-stop 
associations in the training phase, which are then retrieved in the test phase. Similarly, we 
found that p(respond|no-go) was higher for inconsistent stimuli (10.2%) than for 
consistent stimuli (5.2%), suggesting that response inhibition benefited from a consistent 
stimulus-stop mapping.  
To further test whether the longer go RTs for inconsistent stimuli were due to the 
retrieval of stimulus-stop associations (i.e., the automatic-inhibition hypothesis) or to the 
absence of stimulus-go-response association (i.e., the no-stop-learning hypothesis), we 
compared go RT in the first two blocks of the training phase (blocks 1-2) with go RT in 
the two test blocks (blocks 21-22). The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts that go 
RTs for inconsistent stimuli should speed up more in the blocks 1-2 than in blocks 21-22. 
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In blocks 21-22, prior stimulus-stop associations would compete with learning new 
stimulus-go associations, whereas in blocks 1-2 there are no prior stimulus-stop 
associations. Consequently, learning new stimulus-go associations would be faster in 
blocks 1-2 than in blocks 21-22. By contrast, the no-stop-learning hypothesis predicts 
similar learning for inconsistent go stimuli in blocks 1-2 and blocks 21-22 because there 
are no prior stimulus-stop associations to compete with learning new stimulus-go 
associations. As can be seen in Figure 2, the speed-up in the test phase was slower than 
the speed-up in the training phase for inconsistent stimuli, which is in accord with the 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis. This observation is supported by a significant interaction 
between phase (i.e., training phase vs. test phase) and block (i.e., the first block of the 
phase vs. the second block of the phase), F(1, 23) = 5.0, p < .05, ηp2 = .18. No such 
interaction was found for consistent stimuli, F < 1 (see Figure 2). Combined, these 
findings suggest that the longer RTs for inconsistent stimuli in the test phase are due to 
the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations, which interfere with learning new stimulus-go 
associations, and not to the absence of learning of stimulus-go associations in the training 
phase.  
Discussion. In the test phase of Experiment 2, we found that go RTs were longer 
for inconsistent go stimuli that were associated with stopping in the training phase than 
for consistent go stimuli that were associated with going in the training phase. Moreover, 
a comparison of the learning effects in the training phase and the test phase suggests that 
the longer go RTs for inconsistent stimuli are not due to the absence of an association 
between the stimulus and going. Combined, these findings support the automatic-
inhibition hypothesis and suggest that responding to inconsistent stimuli was slowed 
 23 
down because of the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations. Similarly, the p(respond|no-
go) data suggest that stopping performance was impaired for inconsistent no-go stimuli 
that were associated with going in the training phase. Together, the go RT and 
p(respond|no-go) results suggest that stimulus-stop associations influence task 
performance even when the relevant stimulus categories of the training and test phases 
are different.  
As in Experiment 1, the results suggest that retrieval of stimulus-category 
associations and category-go associations may also have played a role. For consistent 
stimuli, go RT was longer and p(respond|no-go) was higher in the test phase than in the 
last blocks of the training phase (see Figure 2), suggesting that category-learning effects 
also played a role. When new stimulus categories were introduced, performance could no 
longer benefit from the retrieval of the stimulus-category associations learned in the 
training phase (Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Logan, 1990; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In 
addition, associations between categories and going could have sped up go RTs and 
improved stop performance throughout the training phase. When new categories were 
introduced in the test phase, performance could no longer benefit from the retrieval of 
these associations. In sum, category learning may also play a role in the go/no-go 
paradigm. Because the training phase of Experiment 2 was similar to the training phases 
of the other experiments, we assume that similar learning effects may have occurred in 
these experiments as well. Consequently, learned stimulus-category associations may 
contribute to the positive effect of retrieving consistent stimulus-stop and stimulus-go 
associations and may reduce the negative effects of retrieving inconsistent stimulus-stop 
and stimulus-go associations (see Discussion Experiment 1).  
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Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the stimulus-stop mappings (e.g., ‘hawk = stop’) and the 
category-stop mappings (e.g., ‘living = stop’) were consistent throughout practice in the 
training phase, which allowed automatic inhibition to develop. Experiment 3 was 
designed to determine whether automatic inhibition could develop when the stimulus-
stop mappings were consistent while the category-stop mappings were inconsistent. To 
do this, we compared a consistent-stimulus-mapping condition with an inconsistent-
stimulus-mapping condition.  
In the both conditions, the go/no-go mapping changed after every block (e.g., 
‘living = go’ in block 1, ‘non-living = go’ in block 2, ‘living = go’ in block 3, ‘non-living 
= go’ in block 4, and so on), making the category-go and category-stop mappings 
inconsistent. In the consistent stimulus-mapping condition, the stimulus set also changed 
after every block (i.e., whenever the go/no-go mapping changed). Half of the stimuli 
were presented in blocks 1, 3, 5... and the other half of the stimuli were presented in 
blocks 2, 4, 6.... Thus, particular stimuli were associated consistently with stopping and 
going even though the categories were not consistently associated with stopping and 
going (e.g., ‘goat’ was a go stimulus in blocks 1, 3, 5… but did not occur in blocks 2, 4, 
6...; ‘horse’ was a no-go stimulus in blocks 2, 4, 6… but did not occur in blocks 1, 3, 
5…). In the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition, each stimulus was presented in 
every block. Consequently, the stimulus mapping and the category mapping were both 
inconsistent (e.g.,  ‘hawk’ was a go stimulus in blocks 1, 3, 5… and a no-go stimulus in 
blocks 2, 4, 6…; similarly, ‘living’ was the go category in blocks 1, 3, 5… and the no-go 
category in blocks 2, 4, 6…).  
 25 
The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts that stimulus-stop associations 
would develop in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). To test this idea, we reversed the stimulus mapping in a test phase at 
the end of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition and we performed two 
comparisons. First, we compared performance in the test phase of the consistent-
mapping-condition with performance in the last two blocks of the training phase of the 
consistent-mapping-condition. The stimulus mapping is reversed in the test phase, so the 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts longer go RT and higher p(respond|signal) in the 
test phase than in the last blocks of the training phase. Second, we compared performance 
in the test phase of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition with performance in block 
2 of the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. For go RTs, this comparison examines 
the first go response to a repeated stimulus in both conditions, pitting 12 no-go trials (and 
0 go trials) in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition against one no-go trial (and 0 go 
trials) in the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. The automatic-inhibition 
hypothesis predicts that the probability that stimulus-stop associations are retrieved 
should be higher after 12 repetitions than after one, so go RT should be longer in the test 
phase of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition than in block 2 of the inconsistent-
stimulus-mapping condition (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). By contrast, the 
no-stop-learning hypothesis predicts no difference in go RT because subjects respond to 
the stimulus for the first time. (Note that the no-stop-learning hypothesis predicts shorter 
go RTs in the test phase of the consistent-stimulus mapping condition when stimulus-
category associations are learned). For p(respond|signal), this second comparison 
examines the first no-go response to a repeated stimulus in both conditions, pitting 12 go 
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trials (and 0 no-go trials) in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition against one go 
trial (and 0 no-go trials) in the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. The automatic-
inhibition hypothesis and the no-stop-learning hypothesis predict that p(respond|signal) 
should be higher in the test phase of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition than in 
block 2 of the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. 
Method  
Subjects. Twenty-eight subjects (14 subjects in the consistent-stimulus-mapping 
condition and 14 subjects in the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition) from 
Vanderbilt University participated for monetary compensation ($6). All subjects reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were native speakers of English. None of them 
participated in Experiments 1 or 2.  
 Apparatus and stimuli. These were similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following: a list of 60 words (this list was different from the list used in Experiment 2) 
was drawn from a list of 640 words used by Arrington and Logan (2004). Word length 
ranged from 3 to 8 letters and averaged 4.43 and 4.40 for living and nonliving stimuli, 
respectively. The word frequency ranged from 6 to 127 per million and averaged 24.7 
and 25.1 for living and nonliving stimuli, respectively (Kučera & Francis, 1967).  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except for the following:  
In both the consistent-stimulus-mapping and inconsistent-stimulus-mapping conditions, 
the mapping of categories (living or non-living) onto go and no-go was reversed after 
each block. The consistent-stimulus-mapping condition consisted of 26 blocks of 30 
trials, divided into a training phase (blocks 1-24) and a test phase (blocks 25-26). In the 
training phase, half of the stimuli were presented in the even blocks and the other half 
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were presented in the odd blocks. Consequently, half of the stimuli always required a go 
response and half always required a no-go response (i.e., stimulus mapping was 
consistent). In the test phase, we changed the stimulus mapping: stimuli that were 
presented in the even blocks (blocks 2, 4, 6…) were presented in block 25 and stimuli 
that were presented in the odd blocks (blocks 1, 3, 5…) were presented in block 26. 
Consequently, stimuli that were associated with stopping in the training phase were go 
stimuli in the test phase and vice versa. The inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition 
consisted of 12 blocks of 60 trials. Each stimulus was presented once in each block and 
the go/no-go mapping changed after every block. Consequently, each stimulus required a 
go response as often as it required a no-go response (i.e., stimulus mapping was 
inconsistent). 
For half of the subjects in each mapping condition, living stimuli were go stimuli 
in the odd blocks and non-living-stimuli were go stimuli in the even blocks. This order 
was reversed for the other half of the subjects. In both conditions, subjects received 
instructions at the beginning of each block and the go category was presented on the top 
and bottom of the screen during the whole block. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, subjects 
did not receive feedback after each block. This was done to avoid having subjects receive 
more feedback in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition than in the inconsistent-
stimulus-mapping condition. 
Results and Discussion 
Go RTs and p(respond|no-go) are depicted in Figure 3. The percentage of correct 
go trials was 98% and was not further analyzed. Mean RTs for correct go trials were 
calculated after removal of RTs longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean for each trial type 
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(2.6%). Global analyses for the training and test phases appear in Appendix 3. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, performance did not improve much over practice in the training phase 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). There was no difference in go RT between consistent- and 
inconsistent-stimulus-mapping conditions, suggesting that consistent associations 
between the stimulus and going did not improve performance when the category-go 
mapping changed after each block. For the p(respond|no-go) data, we found that no-go 
performance was numerically better in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition than in 
the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition (see Figure 3). However, this difference 
failed to reach significance (see Appendix 3). 
To test the idea that stimulus-stop associations developed in the consistent-
stimulus-mapping condition, we compared performance in the test phase (blocks 25 and 
26) with performance in the last two blocks (blocks 23 and 24) of the training phase of 
the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition. For this analysis, we collapsed across blocks 
23 and 24 (training) and across blocks 25 and 26 (test). Go RTs were longer in the test 
phase (571 ms) than in the last blocks of the training phase (547 ms), F(1,13) = 7.5, MSE 
= 549, p < .05, ηp2 = .36, confirming the predictions of the automatic-inhibition 
hypothesis. As can be seen in Figure 3, p(respond|no-go) numerically increased in the test 
phase, but this difference was not significant, F(1,13) < 1.6. To test whether the longer go 
RTs in the test phase were due to the retrieval of the stimulus-stop associations (i.e., the 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis) or to the absence of stimulus-go associations (i.e., the 
no-stop-learning hypothesis), we compared performance in the test phase of the 
consistent-stimulus-mapping condition with performance in block 2 of the inconsistent-
stimulus-mapping condition, pitting 12 no-go trials (and 0 go trials) against one no-go 
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trial (and 0 go trials). As can be seen in Figure 3, go RTs were significantly longer in 
blocks 25 and 26 of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition (571 ms) than in block 2 
(530 ms) of the inconsistent stimulus-mapping condition, F(1,26) = 8.8, MSE = 1,382, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .25. This finding disconfirms the predictions of the no-stop-learning 
hypothesis and suggests that the longer go RTs in the test phase are due to the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations and not to the absence of stimulus-go associations. We did not 
observe a significant difference for p(respond|no-go) data, F < 1.  
We also tested whether automatic inhibition could occur when the stimulus-stop 
mappings were inconsistent by comparing performance in the test phase of the consistent-
stimulus-mapping condition with performance in the last block (i.e., block 12) of the 
inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. As can be seen in Figure 3, go RTs were 
significantly longer in the test phase of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition (571 
ms) than in block 12 (524 ms) of the inconsistent stimulus-mapping condition, F(1,26) = 
7.6, MSE = 2,037, p < .05, ηp2 = .22. This finding suggests that stimulus-stop associations 
were acquired in the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition but not in the inconsistent-
stimulus-mapping condition (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
Discussion. In Experiment 3, we further tested the role of consistent stimulus-stop 
associations in automatic inhibition. In the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition, 
stimuli were consistently associated with stopping and going whereas the categories were 
inconsistently associated with stopping and going. In the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping 
condition, both the stimuli and categories were inconsistently associated with stopping 
and going. Go RT was longer in the test phase of the consistent-stimulus-mapping 
condition than in block 2 of the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition. Again, this 
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finding confirms the automatic-inhibition hypothesis and disconfirms the no-stop-
learning hypothesis because subjects responded to the stimulus for the first time in both 
the test block of the consistent-stimulus-mapping condition and block 2 of the 
inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition.  
We did not find differences in go performance in the training phase of the 
consistent-stimulus-mapping condition and the inconsistent-stimulus-mapping condition 
(see Appendix 3). This suggests that go performance is influenced by the consistency of 
associations between the category and going or stopping. Indeed, there was greater 
improvement with practice in Experiments 1 and 2, which involved consistent category 
mappings, than in the present experiment, which did not (compare Figures 2 and 3 with 
Figure 3). This suggests that consistent category mappings may play an important role in 
addition to consistent stimulus mappings: categories may also be associated with 
stopping and going, and the retrieval of category-go and category-stop associations may 
influence task performance. Possibly, the stimulus-go associations were weaker than the 
stimulus-stop associations in this experiment, explaining why changing the category-go 
mapping undid the benefit of consistent stimulus-go associations in the training phase 
whereas changing the category-stop mapping did not undo the cost of inconsistent 
stimulus-stop associations in the test phase.  
Experiment 4 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrated that subjects learned associations between go 
stimuli and going and between no-go stimuli and stopping in the training phase. When 
the stimuli are presented in the test phase, stimulus-go and stimulus-stop associations are 
retrieved, which impairs performance if the associations are inconsistent but facilitates 
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performance if the associations are consistent. Experiment 3 demonstrated that automatic 
inhibition could develop through practice when the associations between stimuli and 
stopping were consistent even when the associations between categories and stopping 
were inconsistent. 
In Experiment 4, we examined the amount of practice that is necessary for 
automatic-inhibition effects to emerge by varying the number of repetitions in the 
training phase. Studies of skill acquisition show that automaticity develops as a function 
of the number of repetitions in the training phase (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). Thus, the probability that a stimulus-stop association is retrieved should increase 
with the number of repetitions in the training phase. To test this idea, we manipulated the 
number of repetitions of go and no-go stimuli. There were four repetition conditions: 1-
training-block condition, the 4-training-blocks condition, the 8-training-blocks condition, 
and the 16-training-blocks condition. The training phase of each condition consisted of a 
variable number of training blocks (i.e., 1, 4, 8, or 16). All words were presented one 
time per training block. The training phase of each condition was followed by a test block 
in which the go/no-go mapping was reversed. In the test block, all stimuli were 
inconsistent. If the probability that a stimulus-stop association is retrieved increases with 
practice, then automatic-inhibit effects are more likely to emerge when the number of 
repetitions in the training phase increases.  
Method 
 Subjects. Twenty-four subjects from Vanderbilt University participated for 
monetary compensation ($12). All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and were native speakers of English. None of them had participated in Experiments 1-3. 
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 Apparatus and stimuli. These were similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following: a list of 160 words was drawn from a list of 640 words used by Arrington and 
Logan (2004). For every subject, 4 different subsets of 40 words were selected. The first 
subset was presented in the 1-training-block condition, the second subset was presented 
in the 4-training-blocks condition, the third subset was presented in the 8-training-blocks 
condition and the fourth subset was presented in the 16-training-blocks condition. The 
word length ranged from 3 to 11 letters and averaged 5.1 and 5.3 for living and nonliving 
stimuli, respectively. The word frequency ranged from 4 to 117 per million and averaged 
15.4 and 15.7 for living and nonliving stimuli, respectively (Kučera & Francis, 1967).  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except for the following: 
There were four conditions to the experiment. Each condition consisted of a variable 
number of training blocks (i.e., 1, 4, 8, or 16 training blocks) and one test block. The 
order of the conditions was counterbalanced according to a balanced Latin square. During 
the training and test phase, subjects made living/non-living judgments about the referents 
of words. For half of the subjects, living stimuli were go stimuli and non-living stimuli 
were no-go stimuli in the training phase. For the other half, this mapping was reversed. 
The go/no-go mapping was the same for the four training phases and was always reversed 
in the test phase (e.g., ‘living = go’ and ‘non-living = no-go’ in the training phases, and 
‘non-living = go’ and ‘living = no-go’ in the test phases).  
 For each condition, a non-overlapping list of 40 words was selected from the set 
of 160. We used a different stimulus list for each condition to avoid transfer effects 
between conditions. Each training block and the test block consisted of 40 trials and each 
word was presented once per block in random order. We used the same words for the 
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training and test phases of each condition. In each condition, subjects received 
instructions explaining the go/no-go mapping rules before the first block of the training 
phase and before the test block. 
Results and Discussion 
 Go RTs and p(respond|no-go) are depicted in Figure 4. The percentage of correct 
go trials was 98% and was not further analyzed. Mean RTs for correct go trials were 
calculated after removal of RTs longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean for each trial type 
(2.5%). Global analyses for the training and test phase and planned comparisons of 
interest appear in Appendix 4. Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, there was significant 
learning in each training phase that did not differ significantly between conditions.  
To test whether automatic inhibition depends on the amount of practice in the 
training phase, we compared performance in each test block with performance in the last 
block of the training phase that preceded it. For the 1-training-block condition, we found 
that go RTs were shorter in the test block (536 ms) than in the training block (573 ms), 
suggesting that automatic-inhibition effects do not emerge after one presentation. This 
could be because subjects had not learned the association between stimulus and stopping 
or that the effect of the stimulus-stop association was counteracted completely by the 
retrieval of stimulus-category associations (see Discussion Experiments 1 and 2).We 
found longer go RTs in the test block for the other conditions (see Figure 4), suggesting 
that associations between the stimulus and stopping developed after 4, 8, or 16 
repetitions. For the 4-training-blocks condition, go RTs were longer in the test block (530 
ms) than in the last block of the training phase (514 ms). The slowing was more 
pronounced for the 8-training-blocks condition (training: 504 ms; test: 538 ms) and the 
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16-training-blocks condition (training: 482 ms; test: 516 ms). This observation was 
further supported by a linear contrast (see Appendix 4). Note that there was still a linear 
trend when we included only the 4-, 8- and 16-training-blocks condition, although the 
contrast no longer reached significance, p = .10 (see Appendix 4).Combined, these 
findings suggest that the strength of associations between stimuli and stopping increases 
with the number of repetitions (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). However, this 
conclusion should be interpreted with caution because strength of association is assessed 
by comparing the last training block with the test block. Go performance in the last 
training block differs between the training conditions because go performance improves 
over practice, changing the baseline against which transfer is assessed. Consequently, the 
difference between the last block of the training phase and the test block may not allow a 
direct test of the strength of stimulus-stop associations. 
For the p(respond|no-go) data, we found a similar effect of practice. For the 1-
training-block condition, we found that p(respond|no-go) was higher in the training block 
(8.1%) than in the test block (5.4%), suggesting that stopping performance was not 
impaired after only one presentation. For the 4-training-blocks condition, we did not find 
a difference between the last block of the training phase and the test block. In line with 
Experiments 1 and 2, we found that for the 8-training-blocks condition, p(respond|no-go) 
was lower in the last block of the training phase (2.9%) than in the test block (5.8%). We 
found a similar difference for the 16-training-blocks condition (training: 3.1%; test = 
5.4%), although this difference failed to reach significance (see Appendix 4). Combined, 
the findings for the 8-training-blocks and 16-training-blocks conditions suggest that 
stopping performance was impaired when the stimulus was associated frequently with 
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going in the training phase. In line with the go RT results, the linear contrast including all 
training-block conditions was significant (see Appendix 4). 
Discussion. In Experiment 4, we tested whether automatic inhibition was 
influenced by the number of repetitions in the training phase. The automatic-inhibition 
hypothesis predicted that the probability that stimulus-stop associations are learned and 
subsequently retrieved should increase with the number of repetitions in the training 
phase (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In accord with this prediction, we 
found longer go RTs in the test block than in the last block of the training phase for the 4-
, 8-, and 16-training-blocks conditions but not for the 1-training-block condition. 
Similarly, p(respond|no-go) was higher in the test phase than in the last block of the 
training phase for the 8-training-blocks condition and the 16-training-blocks condition, 
suggesting that the probability that stimulus-go associations are learned and subsequently 
retrieved increased with the number of practice trials. 
 We found that the go RT slowing and p(respond|no-go) increase were similar for 
the test phase of the 8-training-block condition and the test phase of the 16-training-block 
condition (see Figure 4). This finding is consistent with the general finding that learning 
curves are negatively accelerated (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), showing substantial 
gains in early practice that diminish with further experience (i.e., the difference between 
block n-1 and block n becomes smaller when n increases). The idea of diminishing gains 
in Experiment 4 is further supported by the data from the training phases of each part, 
showing that the largest learning effects were observed in the first few training blocks 
(see Figure 4).  
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Experiment 5 
In Experiments 1-4, we demonstrated that responses can be automatically inhibited in the 
go/no-go paradigm through the retrieval of consistent stimulus-stop associations. In 
Experiment 5, we tested whether automatic inhibition could also occur in a modified 
version of the stop-signal paradigm in which some of the choice stimuli were consistently 
associated with stopping and going.  
In the stop-signal paradigm, choice stimuli are usually associated with both 
stopping and going: on no-stop-signal trials (i.e., trials on which no stop signal is 
presented), the choice stimulus is associated with going, whereas on stop-signal trials 
(i.e., trials on which a stop signal is presented), the choice stimulus is associated with 
stopping (although this may depend on the outcome of the race between stopping and 
going; see below). Because of the inconsistent associations between choice stimuli and 
going and stopping, automatic inhibition is unlikely to develop and subjects would have 
to rely on controlled inhibition to stop their responses throughout the whole experiment 
(cf. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). However, stop-signal studies that examined aftereffects 
of response inhibition showed that stimuli can be associated with stopping (Verbruggen 
& Logan, in press-a, in press-b; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 
2008).  Go RT on no-stop-signal trials was longer after successful stopping when the 
stimulus from the stop trial was repeated but not when the stimulus alternated (for similar 
findings, see Rieger & Gauggel, 1999). Verbruggen and Logan (in press-b) found that 
slowing after successful inhibition can be observed up to 20 trials after the first 
presentation of the stimulus. Aftereffects of unsuccessful inhibition were smaller or even 
absent (Verbruggen & Logan, in press-a, in press-b; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe et al., 
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2008). Together, these results suggest that stimulus-stop associations are less likely to be 
learned when inhibition is unsuccessful. 
The long-term aftereffects of successful stopping suggest that automatic inhibition 
may be possible in the stop-signal paradigm if stimulus-stop associations are consistent 
over practice. To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 5, we used a modified version of the 
stop-signal paradigm that consisted of a training phase and a test phase. In the training 
phase, a subset of the choice stimuli was consistently associated with stopping or going 
and another subset was inconsistently associated with stopping and going, as is typical in 
stop-signal experiments. In the test phase, we reversed the stimulus-stop and stimulus-go 
mappings for consistent stimuli, similar to the procedure of Experiments 1-4.  
 We distinguished between four stimulus types:  
(1) Stop-go stimuli always occurred with a stop signal during training, and so were 
consistently associated with stopping in the training phase. They were always 
presented without a stop signal trial during testing and so were consistently 
associated with going in the test phase. These stimuli correspond to the 
inconsistent go stimuli in the test phase of Experiments 1-4. 
(2) Go-stop stimuli never occurred with a stop signal during training, and so were 
consistently associated with going in the training phase. They were always 
presented with a stop-signal during testing and so were consistently associated 
with stopping in the test phase. These stimuli correspond to the inconsistent no-go 
stimuli in the test phase of Experiments 1-4. 
(3) Stop+go stimuli occurred with and without a stop signal in training and testing, 
and so were inconsistently associated with both stopping and going in both 
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phases. These stimuli correspond to the stimuli typically used in the stop-signal 
procedure.  
(4) Go-go stimuli never occurred with a stop signal, and so were consistently 
associated with going in both the training and test phases. We will use these 
stimuli as a baseline to assess the automatic-inhibition effects on go trials.  
The automatic-inhibition hypothesis predicts longer go RTs for stop-go stimuli than for 
stop+go and go-go stimuli in the test phase, suggesting that automatic inhibition can also 
occur in the stop-signal paradigm when the stimuli are consistently associated with 
stopping. It also predicts that the probability of responding on stop-signal trials 
[p(respond|signal)] during the training phase should be lower for stop-go stimuli than for 
stop+go stimuli because stop-go stimuli were consistently associated with stopping. 
Finally, we compared go RTs for stop+go stimuli and go-go stimuli to test whether go 
performance improves over practice when stimuli are consistently associated with going.  
Method 
 Subjects. Twenty subjects from Vanderbilt University participated for monetary 
compensation ($12). All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
native speakers of English. None of them had participated in Experiments 1-4. 
 Apparatus and stimuli. These were similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following: we used a subset of 100 words used in Experiment 1. The word length ranged 
from 3 to 11 letters and averaged 5.2 and 5.7 for living and nonliving stimuli, 
respectively. The word frequency ranged from 1 to 32 per million and averaged 11.6 and 
12.2 for living and nonliving stimuli, respectively (Kučera & Francis, 1967). The 
assignment of words to the different stimulus types was different for each subject. 
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 Subjects made living/non-living judgments about the referents of words and 
responded by pressing the ‘Z’ ('living') or the ‘/’ key ('non-living') of a QWERTY 
keyboard with the left and right index fingers, respectively. On stop-signal trials, a loud 
and clear auditory stop signal (750 Hz, 80dB, 75 ms) was presented through closed 
headphones (Sennheiser eH 150), using stop-signal presentation functions of the program 
STOP-IT (Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens, 2008). 
Procedure. Instructions emphasized both accuracy and speed. Subjects were not 
informed about the different stimulus types and the different phases of the experiment. 
All trials started with the presentation of the choice stimulus. The stimulus was removed 
after 1,000 ms and required a response on no-stop-signal trials within 2,500ms, after 
which time the new stimulus was presented. On stop-signal trials, an auditory tone was 
presented, instructing subjects to stop their response. The stop signal was presented after 
a variable stop-signal delay: 100, 200, 300, 400, or 500 ms after the onset of the choice 
stimulus. Subjects were told not to wait for the stop signal and that the stop signal would 
be presented at several delays so it would be easy to stop on some trials and difficult or 
impossible to stop on others. 
The experiment consisted of 10 blocks and each word was presented once per 
block. Stimulus presentation was pseudo-randomized. First, stop-go stimuli (15 per 
block) were presented on stop-signal trials in the training phase (blocks 1-8) and on no-
stop-signal trials in the test phase (blocks 9-10). Second, go-stop stimuli (15 per block) 
were presented on no-stop-signal trials in the training phase and on stop-signal trials in 
the test phase. Third, stop+go stimuli (30 per block) were presented on both stop-signal 
trials and on no-stop-signal trials in both phases. In every block, half of the stop+go 
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stimuli were presented on stop-signal trials (15 per block) and the other half was 
presented on no-stop-signal trials (15 per block). Every stop+go stimulus was presented 
four times on a stop-signal trial in the training phase. Fourth, go-go stimuli (40 per block) 
were presented on no-stop-signal trials in both the training and test phases. Note that we 
used more go-go stimuli than other stimulus types to ensure that the overall proportion of 
stop-signal trials (30%) was comparable to the proportion of stop-signal trials used in 
other studies (see Logan, 1994). At the end of each block, the mean RT on go trials, the 
number of choice errors on no-stop-signal trials, the number of missed responses on no-
stop-signal trials, and the probability of stopping on a stop-signal trial were displayed and 
subjects had to pause for at least 10 seconds. 
Results and Discussion  
Global analyses of go RT, choice error rates and p(respond|signal) appear in 
Appendix 5. In the analysis of the test phase, we included only stop-go stimuli for which 
p(respond|signal) was less than 50% after the training phase to ensure that stop-go stimuli 
were actually associated with stopping. Previous research has shown that subjects are less 
likely to learn stimulus-stop associations when stopping is unsuccessful (see above). This 
was important to allow a comparison with the go/no-go experiments, in which inhibition 
was successful on the majority of the trials. We show in Appendix 6 that the effects 
observed in the test phase were not caused by item selection artifacts.  
 Mean no-signal RTs, choice error rates for no-stop-signal trials and 
p(respond|signal) are depicted in Figure 5. Mean RTs for correct no-stop-signal trials 
were calculated after removal of RTs longer than 2.5 SDs above the mean for each trial 
type (2.8%). For each subject, there were on average at least 12 trials for each cell of the 
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design matrix. We also report stop-signal reaction times (SSRT) in Appendix 5. For 
choice error rates, no significant differences were found so we will focus on go RT and 
p(respond|signal) only.  
Go RT for all stimulus types decreased as a negatively-accelerated function of 
practice in the training phase. As can be seen in Figure 5 and Appendix 5, comparisons of 
the difference between block 1 and block 8 for the three stimulus types showed that this 
speed-up was more pronounced for go-go stimuli and go-stop stimuli than for stop+go 
stimuli, suggesting that go performance benefited from the retrieval of consistent 
stimulus-go associations. Similarly, p(respond|signal) was significantly lower for stop-go 
stimuli than for stop+go stimuli, suggesting that stopping performance in the training 
phase benefited from a consistent stimulus-stop mapping. We also analyzed 
p(respond|signal) as a function of SSD (see Appendix 5). In accord with the horse race 
model (Logan & Cowan, 1984), p(respond|signal) increased with increasing SSD in the 
training phase. For stop+go stimuli, p(respond|signal)  = 0.05, 0.11, 0.27, 0.58 and 0.80 
for SSD of 100-500 ms, respectively. For stop-go stimuli, p(respond|signal)  = 0.06, 0.09, 
0.25, 0.56 and 0.73 for SSD of 100-500 ms, respectively. Thus, it appears that the overall 
p(respond|signal) difference between stop+go and stop-go stimuli was mainly due to a 
difference between the stimulus types at the longest SSD. 
 To test whether automatic inhibition could also occur in the stop-signal paradigm, 
we compared go RTs for the different stimulus types in the test phase. In accord with the 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis, go RTs were longer for stop-go trials (668 ms) than for 
go-go trials (634 ms) and stop+go trials (651 ms), F(1,38) = 18.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, and 
F(1,38) = 4.5, p < .05, ηp2 = .11, respectively (see Figure 5). These differences suggest 
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that previously learned stimulus-stop associations are retrieved, which then activates the 
stop goal even when no stop signal is presented. Go RTs were shorter for go-go stimuli 
than for stop+go stimuli, F(1,23) = 4.6, p < .05, ηp2 = .11, suggesting that consistent 
stimulus-go associations improved performance with go-go stimuli or inconsistent 
stimulus-stop and stimulus-go associations impaired stop+go performance through 
automatic inhibition. The other effects were non-significant (see Appendix 5). 
P(respond|signal) in the test phase was 0.36 on average and was not influenced by block 
or trial type (see Figure 5). Possibly, we did not find the same difference we observed in 
training because there were only two test blocks, compared to eight training blocks.  
 Discussion. Experiment 5 replicated the main findings of Experiment 1-4: we found 
that responding in the test phase slowed when stimuli were consistently associated with 
stopping in the training phase and that response inhibition in the training phase benefited 
from consistent associations between the stimulus and stopping (see Figure 5 and 
Appendix 5). These findings support the automatic-inhibition hypothesis, suggesting that 
under the right circumstances, retrieval of associations between the stimulus and stopping 
can support performance in the stop-signal paradigm. Also, the findings of Experiment 5 
suggest that automatic inhibition can develop when the probability of no-go trials is low. 
Stop signals occurred on only 30% of the trials, yet automatic inhibition developed with 
consistent stimulus-stop mapping. This suggests that the results of our go/no-go 
experiments can be generalized to versions of the go/no-go task in which the proportion 
of no-go trials is lower than 50% (see e.g., Hershey et al., 2004; Rubia et al., 2001; 
Schulz et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2005).  
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 In the training phase, we found that the speed-up in go RT was more pronounced 
for go-go and go-stop stimuli than for stop+go stimuli, suggesting that the retrieval of 
stimulus-go-goal associations, stimulus-go-response associations or both facilitated 
performance. In the previous experiments, we could not distinguish between these two 
possibilities. However, in this experiment, we can use choice accuracy data to distinguish 
them. When subjects retrieve associations between the stimulus and the correct response 
(e.g., ‘hawk = left’), both go RT and error rates should decrease over practice. By 
contrast, when subjects retrieve associations between the stimulus and the go goal (i.e., 
the goal of responding to a word on the screen without specifying the exact response) RT 
should decrease but error rate need not. As can be seen in Figure 5 and Appendix 5, go 
error rates did not improve over practice and there were no significant differences 
between the different stimulus types. This finding suggests that at least part of the speed-
up is due to associations between the stimulus and the go goal, whereas associations 
between stimuli and go responses seem to play a lesser role.   
 In the training phase, we also found a learning benefit for stop performance. Even 
though the difference was relatively small, p(respond|signal) was significantly lower for 
stop-go stimuli (which were consistently associated with stopping in the training phase) 
than for stop+go stimuli (which were inconsistently associated with stopping in the 
training phase). This finding suggests that response inhibition in the stop-signal-paradigm 
also benefited from consistent stimulus-stop mappings. The SSRT results reported in 
Appendix 5 further supported this idea.  
 A final question we will address before the General Discussion is whether subjects 
also learned associations between the stop signal and stopping over practice. Only few 
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studies looked at practice effects in the standard stop-signal paradigm and results are 
mixed. Logan and Burkell (1986) found that SSRT decreased over practice (see also e.g., 
Fillmore, Rush, Kelly & Hays, 2001), and this suggests that response inhibition could 
become more automatic. However, Cohen and Poldrack (2008) did not find shorter 
SSRTs over practice.  These inconsistent practice effects for SSRT suggest that response 
inhibition may benefit less from learning associations between the stop signal and 
stopping than from learning associations between choice-task stimuli and stopping (as 
shown in the present study). Associations between choice stimuli and stopping can be 
retrieved and activated before the stop signal is presented. Therefore, consistent 
associations turn the choice stimulus itself into a stop signal, speeding inhibition by 
effectively shortening stop-signal delay. 
General Discussion 
 In the present study, we investigated whether a response can be inhibited 
automatically through the retrieval of consistent stimulus-stop associations. The 
automatic-inhibition hypothesis assumes that subjects learn associations between the 
stimulus and stopping on no-go or stop trials. When the stimulus is repeated, the stop 
goal is activated through the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations and it suppresses the 
go response (Logan & Cowan, 1984). If the stimulus is consistently mapped onto 
stopping, this inhibition can become automatic (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), thereby reducing the need for top-down executive control processes.  
 Experiments 1-4 tested the automatic-inhibition hypothesis in the go/no-go 
paradigm and Experiment 5 tested the hypothesis in a modified version of the stop-signal 
paradigm. In all five experiments, we reversed the stimulus-stop mapping after a training 
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phase. In blocks 10-11 of the test phase of Experiment 1, we found that go RTs were 
longer for stimuli that were previously associated with stopping than for stimuli than for 
stimuli that were not associated with stopping or going. We replicated these findings in 
the test phases of in Experiments 2-5. In Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5, we also observed that 
the probability of responding on a no-go or stop-signal trial decreased when the stimulus 
was previously associated with stopping. Combined, these findings demonstrate that 
automatic inhibition can develop through practice when stimuli are consistently mapped 
onto stopping (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
Automaticity of Go and Stop Performance 
 Based on the results of the present study, we argue that both go and stop 
performance can become automatic over practice. Initially, go and stop performance 
depend on controlled processing only. Over practice, different types of associations, such 
as stimulus-goal, stimulus-category and category-goal associations, are formed, and this 
will lead to a mixture of controlled and automatic processing. Task performance depends 
on which process (i.e., controlled or automatic) finishes first (Logan, 1988). When the 
number of practice trials increases, so will the probability that automatic processing 
finishes first. Ultimately, subjects can start relying on automatic processing only.  
 The idea of automatic go performance and automatic stop performance can be 
understood in an interactive race model of response inhibition (Boucher et al., 2007). 
Elaborating on the independent race model of Logan and Cowan (1984), Boucher et al. 
assume a race between a go process and a stop process. The go process is initiated by the 
presentation of the go stimulus and activates a go unit (viz., the go goal) whereas the stop 
process is initiated by the presentation of the stop signal and activates the stop unit (viz., 
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the stop goal). The go process and the stop process are independent during the initiation 
stage, which constitutes the greater part of their durations1 (see Figure 6). However, once 
the stop unit is activated, it inhibits the go unit strongly and rapidly. The interactive race 
is depicted in Figure 6C. On no-stop-signal trials, activation the go response begins to 
accumulate in the go unit after the initiation stage is finished, and the response is 
executed when a threshold is reached. On stop-signal trials, activation of the go unit 
begins in the same way it begins on no-stop-signal trials, the initiation phase of the stop 
process begins when the stop-signal is presented, and activation of the stop unit begins 
after the initiation stage finishes (also see Gomez, Perea & Ratcliff, 2007). On signal-
inhibit trials, the stop unit is activated before the threshold for the go response is reached, 
and the stop unit suppresses activation in the go unit, thereby preventing activation of the 
go response from reaching the threshold (see Figure 6C). On signal-respond trials, 
activation of the go response reaches the threshold before the stop unit is activated; 
consequently, inhibition fails. 
 Based on the results of Experiments 1-5, we propose that the go unit can be 
activated through associations between the go stimulus and going. Similarly, the stop unit 
can also be activated through associations between the go stimulus and stopping (see 
Figure 6B). When this happens, activation of the stop unit slows the rate at which 
activation of the go response accumulates, which slows go RT relative to stimuli that 
were not associated with the stop goal (see Figure 6D). The data of Experiments 1-5 
suggest that subjects did not rely on automatic processing entirely because the go unit 
often reached threshold when the go stimulus was associated with the stop goal. The data 
also suggest that stop unit activation was weaker when the stop unit is incorrectly 
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activated on go trials than when it is correctly activated on no-go or stop-signal trials, 
which explains why responding was slowed down but not completely inhibited. 
Combined, these findings suggest that go and stop performance depended on a mixture of 
automatic and controlled processing in Experiments 1-5.  
Alternative hypotheses 
 We argued that the results of the present study confirmed the automatic-inhibition 
hypothesis and disconfirmed the alternative no-stop-learning hypothesis. In this section, 
we briefly discuss three other alternative hypotheses: an alternative-response-association 
hypothesis, a response-threshold-adjustment hypothesis and an error-tag hypothesis.  
 The alternative-response-association hypothesis predicts that no-go and stop 
stimuli are associated with an alternative response. This hypothesis assumes that subjects 
stop go responses by preparing an opposing response (e.g., by activating opposing 
muscles). When the stimulus is repeated in the test phase, the association with the 
opposing response will be retrieved, causing interference with the correct response 
alternative. However, recent behavioral evidence suggest that subjects do not stop a 
response through the activation of an alternative response (Camalier et al., 2007; 
Verbruggen, Schneider & Logan, in press). These studies required subjects to replace one 
response with another, so in principle, the first response could be stopped by activating 
the second response. However, modeling and the effects of experimental manipulations 
showed that a stop process was required to inhibit the first response before the second 
one could be activated. Moreover, neuroimaging studies (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank & 
Poldrack, 2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Rubia et al., 2001) and a recent TMS study 
(Coxon, Stinear & Byblow, 2006) suggest the involvement of a global inhibitory 
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mechanism on stop-signal and no-go trials. Combined, these findings undermine the 
alternative-response-association hypothesis.  
 The second hypothesis is the response-threshold-adjustment hypothesis, which 
assumes that the threshold in the go unit is increased when associations between stimuli 
and the stop goal are retrieved. Subjects may expect that they need to stop when the stop 
goal is retrieved, so they may increase the response threshold to reduce the probability of 
responding. This would be consistent with the finding that subjects proactively change 
the response threshold when they expect a stop signal to occur on the next few trials 
(Verbruggen & Logan, in press-c). However, other studies showed that adjusting decision 
criteria is a time-consuming process that subjects find difficult to do proactively on a 
trial-by-trial basis (see e.g., Brown & Steyvers, 2005; Rotello & Macmillan, 2007; 
Strayer & Kramer, 1994). In this present study, subjects would have to make adjustments 
within a trial upon the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations. Therefore, we think that it 
is unlikely that subjects adjust response thresholds when they retrieve stimulus-stop 
associations.  
 A third hypothesis is the error-tag hypothesis, which assumes that no-go stimuli are 
associated with an error tag when an erroneous response is executed, and retrieval of the 
error tag interferes with responding when the stimulus is repeated. In the stop-signal 
paradigm, we found long-term aftereffects of successful stopping but no long-term 
aftereffects of unsuccessful stopping (Verbruggen & Logan, in press-b). This finding 
undermines the error-tag hypothesis. Therefore, we think that it is unlikely that the 
automatic-inhibition effect in the go/no-go paradigm and the stop-signal paradigm can be 
attributed to the retrieval of an error tag.  
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 In sum, we believe that none of the alternative hypotheses can explain the stimulus-
specific learning effects of Experiments 1-5 as adequately as the automatic-inhibition 
hypothesis. It is possible that several factors, including retrieval of different types 
associations and strategic adjustments, played a role to some degree, but we believe that 
the stimulus-specific learning effects are more likely to be due to the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations.  
Differences in Automatic Inhibition in the Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal Paradigms 
 Many researchers assume that response inhibition is a top-down executive control 
process (e.g., Andres, 2003; Logan, 1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Stuphorn & Schall, 
2006). The go/no-go paradigm and the stop-signal paradigm are considered equivalent 
and researchers generalize the results obtained in one paradigm to the other (e.g., Aron et 
al., 2004; Nigg, 2000; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; but see Rubia et al., 2001). The critical 
assumption underlying this practice is that response inhibition is achieved the same way 
in the two paradigms. However, the present study demonstrated that responses can be 
inhibited two ways: a controlled top-down way and an automatic bottom-up way, 
depending on the consistency of the stimulus-stop associations. Stimuli are typically 
mapped consistently onto stopping and going in the go/no-go paradigm, so automatic 
inhibition is likely to occur in the go/no-go paradigm. However, stimuli are typically 
mapped inconsistently onto stopping and going in the stop-signal paradigm, so automatic 
inhibition is unlikely to occur in the stop-signal paradigm. Thus, our results suggest that 
the two paradigms are not equivalent because they allow different kinds of response 
inhibition.  
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 The distinction between automatic and controlled inhibition has important 
implications for many literatures. The go/no-go paradigm and the stop-signal paradigm 
are used to study basic cognitive control processes, inhibitory deficits in psychiatric and 
neurological disorders, life-span development and individual differences. The present 
study suggests that researchers who use the go/no-go paradigm should consider the 
possibility that response inhibition can be achieved automatically through practice with 
consistent stimulus-goal associations. Consequently, performance differences between 
clinical and control groups could be due to differences in controlled inhibition, automatic 
inhibition, or both. If the clinical group has difficulties with learning, automatic inhibition 
may not develop, so they will need to rely on controlled inhibition throughout the 
experiment. Control subjects who do not have learning difficulties can rely on automatic 
and controlled inhibition. For example, patients with schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease 
and Huntington’s disease show impaired performance in the go/no-go task compared to 
control subjects (Crawford et al., 2005; Kiehl et al., 2000; Sprengelmeyer, Lange & 
Homberg, 1995). However, these patient groups also show impaired performance in 
associative learning tasks (e.g., Faust, Balota & Spieler, 2001; Rich, Campodonico, 
Rothlind, Bylsma & Brandt, 1997; Rushe, Woodruff, Murray & Morris, 1999). 
Consequently, the apparent deficit in inhibition may really reflect a deficit in learning: 
control subjects can rely on automatic inhibition as practice progresses, whereas patients 
with schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, and Huntington’s disease may have to rely on 
controlled inhibition throughout the experiment. More generally, brain regions, such as 
the basal ganglia, are involved in response inhibition and associative learning, so lesions 
to these regions could produce response inhibition deficits by impairing the learning of 
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associations between stimuli and the stop goal. When consistent stimulus-goal 
associations are used—as in the typical go/no-go paradigm—researchers cannot 
distinguish between deficiencies in automatic inhibition, controlled inhibition, or both.  
 Studies that show impaired performance in the go/no-go paradigm should 
consider the possibility that the observed deficits really reflect learning deficits. 
However, the opposite pattern of results is also possible; namely, that existing inhibitory 
deficits are not observed because the need for executive control processes is reduced 
throughout practice with consistent stimulus-goal associations. Indeed, several studies 
reported group differences in the stop-signal paradigm but not in the go/no-go paradigm 
(see e.g., Rush, Barch & Braver, 2006; van den Wildenberg et al., 2006). This 
discrepancy in results could be due to the different involvement of controlled inhibition 
in the two paradigms. In the go/no-go paradigm, automatic inhibition develops and the 
need for top-down inhibition is reduced as practice progresses. By contrast, in the stop-
signal paradigm, the inconsistent mapping prevents automatic inhibition from developing 
and the need for controlled inhibition remains high throughout the experiment (although 
some small practice effects can be observed in the stop-signal paradigm as well; see 
above). Consequently, researchers are more likely to observe deficits in controlled 
inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm than in the go/no-go paradigm. 
 In sum, our results suggest that researchers who want to investigate controlled 
inhibition should use inconsistent stimulus-goal mappings to preclude automatic 
inhibition. Stimulus-stop associations are usually inconsistent in the stop-signal 
paradigm, so it may be a better procedure for studying controlled inhibition than the 
go/no-go paradigm. However, it is possible to prevent the development of automatic 
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inhibition in the go/no-go paradigm by increasing the number of go and no-go stimuli so 
there are no repetitions. This would weaken the associations between the stimuli and 
stopping (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and reduce the probability that the stop goal is 
retrieved automatically (Logan, 1988).  
Automatic Control and Cognitive Control of Goal-Directed Behavior 
 In the present study, we propose that automatic inhibition occurs because stimuli 
that are associated with the stop goal retrieve the stop goal when they are repeated, and 
that interferes with go processing. This idea resembles accounts of inhibitory aftereffects, 
such as the negative priming effect (Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill, Valdes, Terry & 
Gorfein, 1992), long-term inhibition of return (Tipper, Grison & Kessler, 2003), and 
certain accounts of task-switching effects (e.g., Koch & Allport, 2006; Mayr & Bryck, 
2005; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003). The common idea in these accounts is that the 
stimulus is associated with higher-level information such as an inhibitory tag, an 
inhibitory state, a task rule, action plan or a task goal. When the stimulus is repeated, this 
higher-level information is retrieved and influences ongoing processing.  
 More generally, the automatic retrieval of associations between stimuli and task 
goals allows bottom-up control of goal-directed behavior (e.g., Ach, 1935; Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960). People may activate and manipulate 
task goals without conscious choice or controlled processing. This way, habits develop 
and people no longer rely on executive processes to perform certain actions. For example, 
if you played soccer in your childhood, seeing a soccer ball during a walk in the park may 
provoke you to kick it or do your favorite soccer trick. However, the possibility that 
stimulus-driven behavior occurs does not imply that executive control processes are 
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never required in everyday life. For novel stimuli and novel situations, the stimulus, 
context or situation may not provide sufficient information to guide goal-directed 
behavior automatically. In this case, people may rely on an executive system that 
manipulates goal representations (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001) or activates action schemas (Norman & Shallice, 1986). If you 
have never seen a soccer ball in your life, it is unlikely that you will automatically kick 
the ball away. However, after inspecting the ball, you may touch it gently with your foot 
to find out if it is heavy. Executive control processes may also be needed when stimulus-
driven or familiar actions are inappropriate in a certain situation or context. In this case, 
people may rely on executive control processes to suppress habitual responses because 
the current situation requires them to do so. Going back to the soccer example, if 
someone tells you not to touch the ball, you may suppress your habit of kicking the ball 
and give it to the owner instead. In sum, we argue that the relative contribution of 
bottom-up and top-down control depends on previous experience and the context in 
which the stimulus is repeated (for similar ideas, see Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007).  
Conclusion 
 The major contribution of the present study is to show that goal-directed 
performance in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms can rely on both bottom-up 
control and top-down control. We propose that automatic and controlled inhibition can 
work together to guide goal-directed behavior; therefore, they should not be regarded as 
opposites (see Logan, 1988). When retrieval of consistent associations is sufficient to 
activate goal representations, performance may rely completely on bottom-up control. 
However, when consistent associations are not available or when higher-level goals 
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require subjects to oppose familiar actions, an executive system may be needed to control 
actions (also see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007).  
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Appendix 1: Analyses for Experiment 1 
 
The data of the inconsistent-test-phase and the consistent-test-phase conditions were 
analyzed by means of separate 2 (stimulus type: old vs. new) x 3 (block: 9-11) repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) (see Table A1). Planned comparisons appear in 
Table A2. For all planned comparisons in Experiments 1-5, we used the error term of the 
interaction. The data of the training phase of the inconsistent-test-phase and the 
consistent-test-phase conditions were analyzed by means of separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs with training block (blocks 1-8) as within-subjects factor (see Table A2).  
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Appendix 2: Analyses for Experiment 2 
 
The data of the test phase were analyzed by means of 2 (consistency: consistent or 
inconsistent) x 2 (block: test block 1 or test block 2) repeated measures ANOVA (see 
Table B1). The data of the training phase were analyzed by means of a 2 (consistency: 
consistent or inconsistent) x 20 (block: 1-20) repeated measures ANOVA (see Table B1).  
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Appendix 3: Analyses for Experiment 3 
 
The data of the training phase were analyzed by means of a 2 (condition: consistent or 
inconsistent) by 12 (number of presentations: 1-12) mixed ANOVA (see Table C1). For 
the consistent-stimulus-goal-mapping condition, we collapsed the data of blocks 1 and 2 
(in both blocks, each stimulus was presented for the first time), the data of blocks 3 and 4 
(in both blocks, each stimulus was presented for the second time), and so on.  
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Appendix 4: Analyses for Experiment 4 
 
The data of the test phase were analyzed by means of 2 (phase: training or test) x 4 
(training blocks: 1, 4, 8, 16) repeated measures ANOVA (see Table D1). The data of the 
training phases of the 4-, 8- and 16-training-blocks conditions were analyzed by means of 
separate repeated measures ANOVAs with block as within-subjects factor (see Table 
D2).  
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Appendix 5: Analyses and SSRTs for Experiment 5 
 
The global analyses appear in Table E1. Go performance in the test phase was analyzed 
by means of a 2 (block: 9-10) x 3 (trial type: stop+go, stop-go, and go-go) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Stop performance was analyzed by means of a 2 (block: 9-10) x 2 
(trial type: stop+go and go-stop) repeated measures ANOVA. Go performance in the 
training phase was analyzed by means of an 8 (block: 1-8) x 3 (trial type: stop+go, go-
stop, and go-go) repeated measures ANOVA. Stop performance was analyzed by means 
of an 8 (block: 1-8) x 2 (trial type: stop+go and stop-go) repeated measures ANOVA, and 
by means of a 5(SSD: 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 ms) x 2 (trial type: stop+go and stop-go) 
repeated measures ANOVA. For the latter analysis, we collapsed p(respond|signal) across 
blocks 1-8 (note that there were not enough stop-signal trials in the test phase to do such 
an analyses). Planned comparisons for the training phase appear in table E2.    
We also estimated SSRT for the training phase (again, there were not sufficient 
stop signals to estimate SSRTs reliably in the test phase). SSRT was estimated via the 
integration method (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Because all stop-go stimuli were present on 
stop-signal trials, we used two different RT distributions for SSRT estimation: (1) the RT 
distribution of the go-go stimuli in the training phase and (2) the RT distribution of 
stop+go stimuli in the training phase. When we used the RT distribution of the go-go 
stimuli for the SSRT estimations, SSRT was 308 ms for stop+go stimuli and 279 ms for 
stop-go stimuli, F(1,19) = 11.9, p < .01. When we used the RT distribution of the stop+go 
stimuli for SSRT estimations, SSRT was 307 ms for stop+go stimuli and 283 ms for stop-
go stimuli, F(1,19) = 8.6, p < .01. The SSRT differences between stop+go and stop-go 
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stimuli are consistent with the significant difference in p(respond|signal) and suggest that 
response inhibition benefited from a consistent stimulus-stop-goal mapping.  
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Appendix 6: Effects of excluding items in Experiment 5 
Consistent with the idea that learning of stimulus-stop associations is influenced by the 
outcome of the stop process, we found a slightly different data pattern when we included 
all stop-go items. Similar to the main analysis (i.e., the analysis after exclusion of a 
subset of the stop-go data for which stopping failed most of the time), we found that the 
main effect of stimulus type was significant when we included all stop-go items (i.e., 
even the items for which response inhibition failed on most of the trials), F(2,38) = 4.3, 
MSE = 1,469, p < .05. Most importantly, the stop-go items (658 ms) were significantly 
slower than go-go items (633 ms) when we included all items, F(1,38) = 8.5, p < .01. 
This finding replicates the differences observed in the go/no-go experiments. There was 
still a small numerical RT difference between stop-go items (658 ms) and stop+go items 
(651 ms), but this was no longer significant, F < 1 (unlike in the main analysis). Thus, it 
appears that exclusion of items does play a role; the crucial question is whether this is due 
to less learning of stimulus-stop associations (as we argued in the main text) or because 
we included only the more difficult stop-go items. Indeed, the probability of stopping 
increases when go RT increases; consequently, p(respond|signal) may be lower for more 
difficult items than for easier items. Of course, a selection of stop-go items on the basis of 
p(respond|signal) could then imply that the included trials were more difficult than the 
excluded trials. In other words, the difference between stop-go stimuli and the other 
stimulus types (for which we did not exclude any items) could be due to item difficulty. 
We tested this item-difficulty hypothesis in several ways.  
 First, we performed an item analysis (i.e., an ANOVA with items as the random 
effect). We used the same exclusion criteria as for the subject analysis, but for this 
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analysis, trial type is a within-item factor, so item difficulty is not an issue here. All items 
that occurred on go-go, stop+go and stop-go trials across all subjects (after exclusion) 
were analyzed; this resulted in a set of 87 items. Mean RTs were analyzed by means of a 
ANOVA with trial type (go-go, stop+go , stop-go) as within-item factor. We found a 
main effect of trial type, F(2,172) = 5.0, MSE = 7,558, p < .01, which suggests that the 
differences between go-go, stop-go, and stop+go generalize across items as well as 
subjects. More importantly, this finding also suggests that the differences observed in the 
subject analyses are not due to item difficulty. Planned comparisons showed that stop-go 
RTs (688 ms) were longer than go-go RTs (647 ms) and stop+go RTs (663 ms); F(1,172) 
= 9.7, p < .01, and F(1,172) = 3.7, p = .057, respectively. The difference between go-go 
RTs and stop+go RTs did not reach significance in the item analyses, F(1,172) = 1.5, p > 
.23. Note that we found similar effects when we did not exclude items on the basis of 
p(respond|signal). For this analysis, we had a set of 94 items. We found a main effect of 
stimulus type, F(2,186) = 3.4, MSE = 7,488, p < .05. Planned comparisons showed that 
stop-go RTs (679 ms) were longer than go-go RTs (647 ms) and stop+go RTs (658 ms); 
F(1,186) = 6.5, p < .01, and F(1,186) = 2.8, p = .098, respectively (although the latter 
difference was only marginally significant; one-tailed p < .05).    
 Second, we compared mean go RT for stop-go items that were either included or 
excluded on the basis of p(respond|signal). We performed both a subject analysis and an 
item analysis. For the subject analysis, we compared signal-respond RTs (i.e., RTs for 
trials on which subjects erroneously executed the response when a stop signal was 
presented) in blocks 1-8 for stop-go items that were included in the test-phase analyses 
with stop-go items that were excluded in the test-phase analyses. We found that signal-
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respond RT for excluded items (611 ms) was similar to signal-respond RT for included 
items (601 ms). This numerical difference did not reach significance, F < 1, although it is 
opposite to what one would expect if the included items are more difficult than the 
excluded items. For the item analysis, we analyzed the difference between included and 
excluded items with item as the random effect. For this item analysis, we calculated mean 
RT for every item on the basis of subjects for which this item occurred on go-go trials in 
the test phase. Items were categorized as ‘included items’ (N = 56) when they were 
always included as a stop-go item across all subjects; items were categorized as 
‘excluded’ items (N = 40) when they were excluded a stop-go item for at least one 
subject. We found that mean go RT was similar for excluded and included items; 649 ms 
vs. 656 ms respectively, F < 1. Combined, these findings suggests that the slower stop-go 
RTs observed in the main subject analyses (i.e., after exclusion of the stop-go items for 
which response inhibition was unsuccessful most of the time) were not due to the 
selection of more difficult items.   
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Footnotes
                                                
1  SSRT primarily reflects the period before the stop unit is activated, during which 
stop and go processing are independent (see Figure 6), so its predictions approximate 
those of the independent race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). 
Table 1: Mean word length and mean word frequency (per million; see Kučera & Francis, 
1967) for the different stimulus categories (range between parentheses) in Experiments 1 
and 2.  
 
 
 Word length Word frequency 
 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
L NL L NL L NL L NL 
Small 
5.3  
(3-9) 
5.9  
(3-11) 
4.9 
(3-8) 
5.2  
(4-8) 
10.6 
(2-37) 
11.4 
(1-34) 
15.1 
(6-37) 
15.7 
(6-34) 
Large 
5.0  
(3-8) 
5.6  
(3-9) 
4.6 
(3-8) 
4.7 
(3-7) 
10.9 
(1-32) 
11.3 
(2-32) 
15.5 
(7-32) 
15.4 
(6-32) 
 
Note: L = Living; NL = non-living 
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Table 2: The four possible mappings for the inconsistent-test-phase condition and the 
four possible mappings for the consistent-test-phase condition 
 Mappings inconsistent-test-phase condition 
 Training phase Test phase 
 go category no-go category go category no-go category 
Mapping 1 living non-living non-living living 
Mapping 2 non-living living living non-living 
Mapping 3 small large large small 
Mapping 4 large small small large 
 Mappings consistent-test-phase condition 
 Training phase Test phase 
 go category no-go category go category no-go category 
Mapping 1 living non-living living non-living 
Mapping 2 non-living living non-living living 
Mapping 3 small large small large 
Mapping 4 large small large small 
 
Note: Mapping was counterbalanced with the restriction that for the same subject, 
different judgment tasks were used for the inconsistent-test-phase condition and the 
consistent-test-phase condition. 
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Table A1 (Appendix1): Overview of the global analyses of the test phase in Experiment 1 
 
 Inconsistent-test-phase condition 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Block (B) 2,30 33.5
** 528 .69 2,30 2.9† 64 .16 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 
1,15 3.6† 922 .19 1,15 0.3 73 .02 
B x ST  2,30 10.7
** 718 .42 2,30 6.2** 38 .29 
 Consistent-test-phase condition 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp
2  F MSe ηp2 
Block (B) 2,30 34.3
** 983 .70 2,30 3.1† 17 .17 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 
1,15 60.5** 1,443 .80 1,15 14.5** 57 .49 
B x ST  2,30 57.9
** 426 .79 2,30 3.1† 29 .17 
 
** p < .01; *p < .05, †p < .08
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Table A2 (Appendix 1): Overview of the planned comparisons for the inconsistent-test-
phase condition and the consistent-test-phase condition in Experiment 1. 
 Old vs. New items: Inconsistent-test-phase condition 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F ηp2 df F ηp2 
block 9 1,30 6.4* .18 1,30 5.5* .15 
block 10 1,30 10.0** .25 1,30 1.1 .04 
block 11 1,30 9.7** .24 1,30 6.3* .17 
 Old vs. New items: Consistent-test-phase condition 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F ηp2 df F ηp2 
block 9  1,30 288.8** .91 1,30 22.4** .42 
block 10  1,30 22.9** .43 1,30 10.9** .27 
block 11  1,30 9.1** .23 1,30 1.5 .05 
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Table A3 (Appendix1): Overview of the global analyses of the training phase in 
Experiment 1 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Inconsistent 
test phase 
7,105 38.3** 428 .72 7,105 4.4** 16 .23 
Consistent 
test phase 
7,105 37.9** 555 .72 7,105 3.6** 17 .20 
 
** p < .01
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Table B1 (Appendix 2): Overview of the global analyses in Experiment 2 
 
 Training Phase  
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Consistency (C) 1,23 0.8 1,445 .04 1,23 0.0 63 .00 
Block 19,437 22.7
** 1,263 .50 19,437 5.3* 23 .19 
C x B 19,437 0.7 462 .03 19,437 0.5 21 .02 
 Test Phase  
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Consistency (C) 1,23 12.5
** 1,538 .35 1,23 3.7† 41 .14 
Block 1,23 14.5
** 2,189 .39 1,23 6.3* 96 .21 
C x B 1,23 2.7
 491 .11 1,23 2.7 25 .11 
 
** p < .01; *p < .05; †p = .06 
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Table C1 (Appendix 3): Analysis of block and condition in Experiment 3 
 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Condition (C)  1,26 0.3 17,574 .01 1,26 2.5 173.5 .09 
Block (B) 11,286 1.7 874 .06 11,286 0.8 18.9 .03 
C x B 11,286 0.7 874 .03 11,286 0.7 18.9 .03 
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Table D1 (Appendix 4): Overview of the global analyses and planned comparisons of 
interest in Experiment 4, comparing performance in the test block with performance in 
the last training block.  
 
 Global Analyses  
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
test-block 
condition (TBC) 
3,69 17.0** 1,495 .43 3,69 2.7† 25.9 .11 
phase (P) 1,24 3.0 2,205 .11 1,24 1.8 21.3 .07 
TBC x P 3,69 20.5** 665 .47 3,69 3.7 20.7 .14 
 Planned comparisons 
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F ηp2 df F ηp2 
1-training-block 
condition 
1,69 25.2** .27 1,69 4.2* .06 
4-training-block 
condition 
1,69 5.0* .07 1,69 0.6 .01 
8-training-block 
condition 
1,69 20.3** .23 1,69 4.9* .07 
16-training-block 
condition 
1,69 20.5** .23 1,69 3.0 .04 
linear contrast  
(all conditions) 
1,69 47.5** .41 1,69 16.6** .20 
linear contrast 
(1-TB excluded) 
1,69 2.6 .04 1,69 0.9 .01 
 
Note: 1-TB excluded = 1-training-block condition excluded; ** p < .01; *p < .05; †p = .05 
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Table D2: Global analysis of the training phase for the 4-block  
 go RT p(respond|no-go) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
4-training-block 
condition 
3,69 15.5** 1,115 .40 3,69 3.6* 22.3 .13 
8-training-block 
condition 
7,161 15.3** 871 .40 7,161 5.2** 19.7 .18 
16-training-block 
condition 
15,345 18.9** 743 .45 15,345 3.3** 15.4 .13 
  
** p < .01; *p < .05
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Table E1 (Appendix 5): Overview of the global analyses in Experiment 5 
 
 go RT 
 training phase (blocks 1-8) test phase (blocks 9-10) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Block (B) 7,133 15.9** 2,874 .46 1,19 3.5 2246 .16 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 2,38 1.4 1,094 .07 2,38 7.0
** 1664 .27 
B x ST  14, 266 2.0* 965 .10 2,38 1.1 1276 .05 
 p(respond|signal) as a function of block 
 training phase (blocks 1-8) test phase (blocks 9-10) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Block (B) 7,133 0.6 0.01 .03 1,19 0.02 0.01 .001 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 1,19 5.2
* 0.01 .21 1,19 0.03 0.01 .002 
B x ST  7,133 0.9 0.01 .05 1,19 0.02 0.01 .001 
 p(respond|signal) as a function of SSD 
 training phase (blocks 1-8) test phase (blocks 9-10) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 1,19 5.1 0.01 .21     
SSD 4,76 137.8 0.02 .88     
ST x SSD 4,76 1.7 0.01 .08     
 go error rates 
 training phase (blocks 1-8) test phase (blocks 9-10) 
 df F MSe ηp2 df F MSe ηp2 
Block (B) 7,133 1.3 17 .06 1,19 3.5† 18 .16 
Stimulus  
Type (ST) 2,38 1.7 45 .08 2,38 2.4 28 .11 
B x ST  14, 266 1.5 16 .07 2,38 1.1 19 .05 
 
Note: ** p < .01; *p < .05; †p = .07 
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Table E2 (Appendix 5): Planned comparisons for the training phase of Experiment 5, 
comparing the difference between block 1 and block 8 for the different stimulus types 
 
 differences df F ηp2 
stop+go vs. go-go 56 ms vs. 86 ms 1,266 4.6* .02 
stop+go vs. go-stop 56 ms vs. 99 ms 1,266 0.8 .00 
go-go vs. go-stop 86 ms vs. 99 ms 1,266 9.5** .04 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: go RTs (in ms; upper panels) and p(respond|no-go) data (in %; lower panels) 
for the training phase (blocks 1-8) and test phase (blocks 9-11) of the inconsistent-test-
phase condition (left panels) and the consistent-test-phase condition in Experiment 1.  
Figure 2: go RTs (in ms; upper panel) and p(respond|no-go) data (in %; lower panel) for 
the training phase (blocks 1-20) and test phase (blocks 21-22) as a function of 
consistency in Experiment 2.  
Figure 3: go RTs (in ms; upper panel) and p(respond|no-go) data (in %; lower panel) for 
the consistent-stimulus-goal-mapping condition and the inconsistent-stimulus-goal-
mapping-condition as a function of the number of presentations in Experiment 3. Data of 
the test phase in the consistent-stimulus-goal-mapping condition appear in the little 
square with dashed contours.  
Figure 4: go RTs (in ms; upper panel) and p(respond|no-go) data (in %; lower panel) for 
the training phase and test phase of every condition (1 training block, 4 training blocks, 8 
training blocks, 16 training blocks) in Experiment 4. In every condition, the test phase is 
the last block of that condition.  
Figure 5: go RTs (in ms; upper panel) and p(respond|signal) data (in %; lower panel) for 
the four stimulus types as a function of the block (blocks 1-8 = training phase; blocks 9-
10 = test phase) in Experiment 5.  
Figure 6: A and B: The interactive race model architecture. The go (G) unit is activated 
via the presentation of the go stimulus. The go response is executed once the threshold is 
reached. Interruption of the go process starts once the stop unit is activated. On stop-
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signal trials (Figure 6A), the stop (S) unit is activated via the presentation of the stop 
signal (left panel). On no-stop-signal trials for which the stimulus was previously 
associated with the stop goal (Figure 6B), the stop (S) unit is activated via the 
presentation of the primary-task stimulus. 
C: Go unit activation for no-stop-signal trials (NS), signal-respond trials (SR) and signal-
inhibit trials (SI) as a function of the primary-task stimulus presentation (GO) and stop-
signal presentation (STOP). The moment the stop unit is activated is indicated by the left-
most vertical dashed line; the moment go processing is successfully interrupted is 
indicated by the right-most vertical dashed line. 
D: Go unit activation for consistent no-stop-signal trials (NS) and no-stop-signal trials on 
which the stop goal is activated through memory retrieval (NS-SI) as a function of the 
primary-task stimulus presentation (GO). The moment the stop unit is activated is 
indicated by the vertical dashed line. 
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Figure 2 
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